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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
Plaintiffs Parkview Associates Partnership, Cham 
Nagaraj, Shushella Nagaraj, David Simpson, and Edward 
Sheib (collectively "Parkview") appeal the District Court's 
order dismissing its action against the City of Lebanon and 
the City of Lebanon Zoning Hearing Board for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. We must decide whether the 
District Court erred in holding that the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine precluded it from entertaining a suit challenging 
the denial of a zoning permit as violative of federal and 
state anti-discrimination statutes because there had been a 
state court appellate, on-the-record review of the adverse 
zoning decision. 
 
II. 
 
The underlying dispute stemmed from the efforts of 
Parkview to obtain a zoning permit to convert the former 
Oakwood Residential Care and Nursing Home, a nursing 
home and personal care facility in the City of Lebanon, into 
a personal care facility. Oakwood operated as a non-profit 
home with 28 nursing beds and 22 personal care beds until 
its closure on November 24, 1994. It was located in an area 
zoned as a Residential Low Density District in the City of 
Lebanon. The City's zoning ordinance does not permit a 
personal care facility in that area. However, the home, 
including its personal care portion, had operated at that 
location for more than 50 years and, as it had been in 
existence before the adoption of the zoning ordinance, was 
considered a valid non-conforming use. 
 
In November 1993, Parkview entered into an agreement 
to purchase Oakwood's real estate and facilities to be 
converted into a full personal care facility with no nursing 
beds.1 On November 29, 1993, Parkview obtained a zoning 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The agreement was actually assigned to Parkview by one of its 
principals. 
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use permit from a city zoning officer to operate a 70-bed 
personal care home at the Oakwood location as a 
continuation of the existing non-conforming use. On March 
2, 1994, however, two residents of the neighborhood where 
Oakwood was located filed an appeal with the City of 
Lebanon Zoning Hearing Board (the "Board") objecting to 
the issuance of the zoning permit on the ground that the 
proposed use was a substantial change in use that was 
more non-conforming than the existing use. 
 
After hearings held in April 1994, the Board revoked 
Parkview's permit. It found that the zoning officer who had 
issued the permit acted beyond his authority when he 
issued the permit without requiring a hearing. The Board 
concluded that Parkview's proposed use would change the 
essential character of the prior use and would increase 
non-conformity, thus making it ineligible for a special 
exception permit. 
 
Parkview appealed the Board's decision to the Court of 
Common Pleas of Lebanon County under the procedure set 
out in Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, S 11002-A. Although the 
parties have not described the statutory procedure, it 
appears that the Court of Common Pleas may hold a 
hearing and receive additional evidence in considering the 
appeal, see Pa. Stat. Tit. 53, S 11005-A, but if the court 
does not take additional evidence, then it, the 
Commonwealth Court, and/or the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania may overturn the Zoning Hearing Board's 
decision only if the Zoning Hearing Board committed an 
abuse of discretion or an error of law. See Baker v. 
Chartiers Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 677 A.2d 1274, 
1276 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). "A conclusion that the zoning 
hearing board abused its discretion may be reached only if 
its findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Id. 
 
In its appeal to the court, Parkview set forth 39 separate 
reasons why the Board's decision was an abuse of 
discretion and/or contrary to law. Although Parkview 
alleged in its notice of appeal to the Court of Common Pleas 
that the Board's consideration of the age of putative 
residents was illegal under state and federal anti- 
discrimination statutes, it did not allege the disability- 
 
                                3 
  
based discrimination claims that it now presents in federal 
court. 
 
The Court of Common Pleas affirmed the Board's decision 
after reviewing the record before the Board to determine 
whether there was substantial evidence to support its 
decision. The court did not mention Parkview's allegations 
of age discrimination, defining its duty in the appeal as "to 
examine the record and determine whether the board 
committed either an abuse of discretion or an error of law 
concerning the issues raised by Parkview," App. at 62, and 
characterizing Parkview's claims as challenging the Board's 
application of the zoning laws to the evidence before it. The 
court described Parkview's challenges to the Board's 
decision as follows: 
 
       1. Whether Objectors filed a timely appeal from the 
       issuance of the use permit to Parkview by the City 
       Zoning Officer. 
 
       2. Whether the City Zoning Officer was acting within 
       his authority when the permit was issued. 
 
       3. Whether the proposed use of the facility by 
       Parkview qualifies as a permitted use by special 
       exception as a convalescent home, or whether the 
       proposed non-conforming use was equally or more 
       appropriate to the use district than the existing non- 
       conforming use. 
 
App. at 63. 
 
Parkview appealed the decision of the Court of Common 
Pleas to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, which 
also affirmed after on-the-record review. Parkviewfiled a 
petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, which was denied. 
 
On September 7, 1994, while its appeal was pending in 
the Court of Common Pleas, Parkview filed a second permit 
application with the City. This time the proposed use was 
for a 50 to 53 bed personal care home on the Oakwood site. 
The City zoning official denied the application,finding that 
the proposed use was a conversion of a non-conforming use 
that required a special exception. Parkview appealed the 
denial to the Zoning Hearing Board by filing a petition for 
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a special exception. The Board held a hearing on October 5, 
1994, and issued a written opinion on November 14, 1994, 
finding, inter alia, that the proposed change of use would 
significantly change the character of the neighborhood. 
Parkview appealed the Board's decision to the Court of 
Common Pleas, which affirmed after on-the-record review. 
Parkview appealed that decision to the Commonwealth 
Court of Pennsylvania on May 27, 1997 but subsequently 
withdrew its appeal. 
 
On March 19, 1998, Parkview filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
against the City of Lebanon and the City of Lebanon Zoning 
Hearing Board (collectively "the City") alleging that the 
Board's denials of the zoning permits were acts of 
discrimination on the basis of disability that violated the 
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 3601-3631, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 12101-12213, the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. SS 701-796(1), and 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 
43, SS 951-963. The City moved for summary judgment on 
all counts arguing, inter alia, that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction over the action under the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine. The District Court granted the motion on that 
ground, holding that Parkview's disability-based 
discrimination claims were barred under the Rooker- 
Feldman doctrine even though Parkview had not raised, 
and the state court had not decided, those claims in the 
state proceeding. 
 
Our review of the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment and its application of the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine is plenary. See Gulla v. North Strabane Township, 
146 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
III. 
 
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on the statutory 
foundation of 28 U.S.C. S 1257 and the well-settled 
understanding that the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and not the lower federal courts, has jurisdiction to 
review a state court decision. Section 1257 states, in 
relevant part: 
 
                                5 
  
       [f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest 
       court of a State in which a decision could be had, may 
       be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari 
       where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United 
       States is drawn in question or where the validity of a 
       statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground 
       of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or 
       laws of the United States . . . . 
 
The doctrine derives from two Supreme Court decisions, 
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 
462 (1983). In Rooker, a party to a state court action that 
had been affirmed by the state's supreme court brought a 
bill in equity in federal district court seeking to have the 
state court judgment declared null and void as being in 
violation of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs' 
allegations in the federal suit were indistinguishable from 
those usually made in an appeal: they claimed that the 
state court had given effect to an unconstitutional state 
statute and had failed to give effect to a prior decision that 
had become law of the case. See 263 U.S. at 415. 
 
The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction over the action. The Court stated: 
 
       It affirmatively appears from the bill that the judgment 
       was rendered in a cause wherein the circuit court had 
       jurisdiction of both the subject matter and the parties; 
       that a full hearing was had therein; that the judgment 
       was responsive to the issues, and that it was affirmed 
       by the Supreme Court of the State on an appeal by the 
       plaintiffs. If the constitutional questions stated in the 
       bill actually arose in the cause, it was the province and 
       duty of the state courts to decide them; and their 
       decision, whether right or wrong, was an exercise of 
       jurisdiction. If the decision was wrong, that did not 
       make the judgment void, but merely left it open to 
       reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely 
       appellate proceeding. 
 
Id. Rooker thus stands for the elementary principle that a 
party's recourse for an adverse decision in state court is an 
appeal to the appropriate state appellate court, and 
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ultimately to the Supreme Court under S 1257, not a 
separate action in federal court. 
 
In Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, decided sixty years after 
Rooker, plaintiffs Marc Feldman and Edward J. Hickey, Jr., 
filed suit in federal court seeking permission to sit for the 
District of Columbia bar examination without having 
attended an ABA accredited law school, a requirement 
under the rules for bar admission adopted by the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals. Prior to filing their federal suit, 
Feldman and Hickey had each petitioned the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals for a waiver of the rule. Both 
applicants had stressed in their petitions the equitable 
reasons for waiving the requirement as to them. Feldman's 
petition had also raised questions of the constitutionality of 
application of the rule if the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals rejected his request. Hickey had submitted 
evidence of his qualifications and stressed the burden that 
would be placed on him if the court refused his petition. 
 
After the District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied 
their petitions for waiver, Feldman and Hickey filed suits in 
federal district court alleging that the denials of their 
petitions violated, inter alia, the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and federal antitrust laws. They 
sought orders from the district court requiring the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals to allow them to sit for the 
bar examination. 
 
The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction over the federal actions. It ruled that the 
proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals were judicial in nature and that Feldman and 
Hickey could not resort to federal court to challenge those 
judicial decisions. The Court stated: 
 
       [T]he[ ] allegations that the District of Columbia Court 
       of Appeals acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying 
       their petitions for waiver and that the court acted 
       unreasonably and discriminatorily in denying their 
       petitions in view of its former policy of granting waivers 
       to graduates of unaccredited law schools required the 
       District Court to review a final judicial decision of the 
       highest court of a jurisdiction in a particular case. 
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       These allegations are inextricably intertwined with the 
       District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decisions, in 
       judicial proceedings, to deny the respondents' 
       petitions. 
 
Id. at 486. 
 
Although the Court held that the plaintiffs' claims 
challenging the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' 
decisions to deny them waivers of the rule could not be 
brought in the district court because those challenges were 
inextricably intertwined with the state court proceedings, 
the Court permitted district court adjudication of plaintiffs' 
general claims challenging the constitutionality of the rule 
itself. The Court explained: 
 
       [T]o the extent that Hickey and Feldman sought review 
       in the District Court of the District of Columbia Court 
       of Appeals' denial of their petitions for waiver the 
       District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over 
       their complaints. Hickey and Feldman should have 
       sought review of the District of Columbia Court of 
       Appeals' judgments in this Court. To the extent that 
       Hickey and Feldman mounted a general challenge to 
       the constitutionality of [the rule requiring attendance of 
       an accredited law school], however, the District Court 
       did have subject-matter jurisdiction over their 
       complaints. 
 
Id. at 482-83 (footnote omitted). 
 
This court has described the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as 
precluding lower federal court jurisdiction over claims that 
were actually litigated or "inextricably intertwined" with 
adjudication by a state's courts. See Gulla v. North Strabane 
Township, 146 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1998); Blake v. 
Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Port 
Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. Port Auth. , 973 F.2d 
169, 178 (3d Cir. 1992) (extending application of the 
doctrine to decisions by lower state courts). Further, we 
have explained that a federal action is inextricably 
intertwined with a state adjudication, and thus barred in 
federal court under Feldman, "[w]here federal relief can only 
be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was 
wrong." Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1430 (3d Cir. 
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1989) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 
(1987) (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
 
Applying that test to this case, we consider first whether 
Parkview's disability-based discrimination claims were 
actually litigated by the state court. We conclude that they 
were not. The record makes plain, and the City does not 
dispute, that Parkview did not present its disability-based 
discrimination claims to the state courts on appeal from the 
Board's decisions. Parkview neither cited the relevant 
statutes nor argued that the Board's decisions violated 
federal or state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of disability. Moreover, the state courts' opinions reveal that 
the courts reviewed the Board's decisions solely in their 
appellate capacity, taking no new evidence, and affirmed 
the Board's decisions as supported by substantial evidence 
in the record without deciding whether the decisions 
violated federal or state anti-discrimination laws. The City 
does not disagree. 
 
We next consider whether Parkview's claims are 
inextricably intertwined with the previous state court 
adjudication. Again, we conclude that they are not. As 
discussed above, the state court proceedings in this case 
were limited to appellate, on-the-record review of whether 
the Zoning Hearing Board abused its discretion or 
committed an error of law in determining that Parkview's 
proposal would change the essential character of the prior 
use and would increase nonconformity. In order to decide 
Parkview's claims alleging that the Board based its 
decisions on considerations prohibited by state and federal 
anti-discrimination statutes, the District Court here would 
not have to review the state courts' determinations that the 
Board's decisions were supported by substantial evidence 
in the record. In other words, adjudication by a federal 
court of Parkview's discrimination claims would not require 
the federal court to determine that the state court was 
wrong. See Centifanti, 865 F.2d at 1430. 
 
Our conclusion that Rooker-Feldman does not bar 
jurisdiction in the District Court over Parkview's 
discrimination claims is consistent with the overwhelming 
precedent in this court construing the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine narrowly. See Whiteford v. Reed, 155 F.3d 671, 
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674 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2231 (2000) 
(holding that Rooker-Feldman did not bar jurisdiction over 
a plaintiff 's claim that had been rejected on procedural 
grounds by the state court); Gulla, 146 F.3d at 172-173 
(holding that Rooker-Feldman did not bar jurisdiction over 
plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims because those claims 
had been dismissed in the state court for lack of standing); 
Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491-92 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (holding that Rooker-Feldman did not bar 
jurisdiction over plaintiff 's claim because the state court 
had not considered that claim and because a federal court 
ruling on plaintiff 's claim "would not have required the 
court to find that the state court judgments . . . were 
erroneous"); FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common 
Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 841-42 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that 
Rooker-Feldman did not bar jurisdiction over plaintiff 's 
claim because a federal court's determination of the claim 
"would not need to conclude that the state court's decision 
was erroneous"); Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 885 n.11 
(3d Cir. 1994) (holding that Rooker-Feldman did not bar 
jurisdiction over plaintiff 's claims because the district court 
could (and did) find that the claims had merit without also 
finding that the state court had erred); cf. Ivy Club v. 
Edwards, 943 F.2d 270, 284 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
Rooker-Feldman did not bar jurisdiction where plaintiff had 
reserved its federal claim under England v. Louisiana State 
Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), on 
appeal to the state court from an agency's decision). 
 
Yet the City argues, and the District Court agreed, that 
Rooker-Feldman barred the District Court from hearing 
Parkview's claims in this case even though the state court's 
adjudication was limited to on-the-record review of the 
Board's decisions. Relying on a footnote in Feldman and on 
language from this court's decision in Valenti v. Mitchell, 
962 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1992), the District Court stated that 
"Rooker-Feldman applies not only to claims which were 
actually brought before the state court, but also to claims 
which could have been raised in that forum." Parkview 
Assocs. Partnership v. City of Lebanon, No. 98-0455, slip 
op. at 10 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 1999). At argument, the City 
relied on language from our decision in Guarino v. Larsen, 
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11 F.3d 1151 (3d Cir. 1993), as additional support for this 
position. 
 
The City's argument, however, fails to appreciate the 
distinction between Parkview's situation and that to which 
the footnote in Feldman was directed. Because the state 
courts did not consider or rule upon Parkview's 
discrimination claim, the only basis to hold Rooker-Feldman 
applicable would be if Parkview's challenge to the Board's 
decisions were inextricably intertwined with the state 
courts' appellate review of those decisions. It is not. 
 
In Feldman, the Court held that any challenges brought 
by Feldman or Hickey to the denial by the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals of their requested waivers of the 
rule requiring attendance at an ABA accredited law school 
for admission to take the bar examination were inextricably 
intertwined with that court's adjudication. See Feldman, 
460 U.S. at 486-87. In a footnote, the Court expressly 
rejected the position taken by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in Dasher v. Supreme Court of Texas, 658 F.2d 
1045 (5th Cir. 1981), that "a federal district court has 
jurisdiction over constitutional claims asserted by a plaintiff 
who has been denied admission to a state bar in a state- 
court judicial proceeding if he failed to raise his 
constitutional claims in the state court." Feldman, 460 U.S. 
at 483 n.16. The Court explained that the district court 
under those circumstances would lack jurisdiction even 
over the claims that had not been raised in the state court 
proceedings if those claims were "inextricably intertwined" 
with the state court's adjudication. It stated: 
 
       If the constitutional claims presented to a United 
       States district court are inextricably intertwined with 
       the state court's denial in a judicial proceeding of a 
       particular plaintiff 's application for admission to the 
       state bar, then the district court is in essence being 
       called upon to review the state-court decision. This the 
       district court may not do. 
 
        Moreover, the fact that we may not have jurisdiction 
       to review a final state-court judgment because of a 
       petitioner's failure to raise his constitutional claims in 
       state court does not mean that a United States district 
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       court should have jurisdiction over the claims. By 
       failing to raise his claims in state court a plaintiff may 
       forfeit his right to obtain review of the state court 
       decision in any federal court. 
 
Id. at 483-84 n.16. 
 
The Feldman footnote thus picks up on a point made in 
the text and makes clear that if a plaintiff 's claims in 
federal court are inextricably intertwined with a previous 
state court adjudication, the district court lacks jurisdiction 
over those claims even if they were not raised in the state 
court. The footnote does not, as the City would have us 
believe, stand for the much broader proposition that 
Rooker-Feldman precludes lower federal court jurisdiction 
over all claims that could have been raised in a previous 
state court proceeding. Such a reading would be 
inconsistent with the Court's other holding in Feldman that 
the district court did have jurisdiction over the general 
challenge to the constitutionality of the rule. The Court 
approvingly referred to lower court decisions recognizing 
"[t]he difference between seeking review in a federal district 
court of a state court's final judgment in a bar admission 
matter [which was barred] and challenging the validity of a 
state bar admission rule [which was not]." Id. at 483-84. If 
the district court is "simply be[ing] asked to assess the 
validity of a rule promulgated in a nonjudicial proceeding 
. . . the district court is not reviewing a state court judicial 
decision." Id. at 486. 
 
Because the Supreme Court held that the claim of 
Feldman and Hickey that the admission rule was 
unconstitutional was not barred by the earlier state court 
adjudication, the district court had jurisdiction over that 
claim and the matter was remanded to it. The obvious 
lesson is that the mere fact that the plaintiffs could have 
brought their constitutional challenge in state court did not 
automatically trigger the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar. 
 
We applied Feldman in Guarino v. Larsen , 11 F.3d 1159. 
Judge Angelo Guarino, a senior judge of the Pennsylvania 
state judiciary, sought to challenge in federal court the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's revocation of his judicial 
assignment, contending that the order deprived him of his 
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liberty and property. Before the revocation was made 
permanent, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a rule 
to show cause on Judge Guarino why the order should not 
remain in effect. Judge Guarino did not respond and the 
Court then affirmed its earlier order, reasoning that the 
temporary assignment of a retired judge is within its 
discretion and may be revoked by it. See id. at 1155. When 
Judge Guarino sought to raise constitutional challenges to 
the state court's decision in federal court, we held that the 
district court had no jurisdiction even though Judge 
Guarino had not raised those challenges in the state court. 
In doing so, we stated that "a litigant must present all of 
his or her claims arising from the same transaction in order 
to avoid waiving those claims he or she does not raise." Id. 
at 1161 n.7. 
 
The underlying premise to our statement, however, was 
that Judge Guarino's challenges were inextricably 
intertwined with the state court adjudication. This was 
evident because Judge Guarino sought to challenge as 
unconstitutional the very decision of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court revoking his judicial assignment. It followed 
that all of Judge Guarino's federal claims, even if they had 
not been raised in the state court proceeding or, as we 
explained there, even if they were "not inextricably tied to 
the state law issues explicitly decided by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court," id. at 1160, were inextricably intertwined 
with the state court's adjudication. Therefore, we held that 
they were barred in the lower federal courts under Rooker- 
Feldman. 
 
The year before, we were presented in Valenti  with 
another Rooker-Feldman issue in an emergency appeal 
taken in the hurried context of an impending primary 
election. As a result of a required and contested 
reapportionment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court revised 
the election calendar. Candidates and representatives for 
prospective candidates brought suit in district court 
alleging that the state court-imposed deadline forfiling 
nominating petitions to the state primary election violated 
their rights to equal protection and free speech guaranteed 
by the United States Constitution. See Valenti , 962 F.2d at 
296. However, those same parties had previously petitioned 
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for relief in the state supreme court from the court-imposed 
filing deadline on the ground that the deadline violated 
their rights to equal protection, a claim that had been 
rejected by the state court. Stating that the plaintiffs could 
not "be allowed to escape Rooker-Feldman by raising a new 
constitutional theory in federal court," we held that their 
free speech as well as their equal protection claim could not 
be brought in federal court. Id. Notably, in the next 
sentence, the opinion shifted its rationale from Rooker- 
Feldman to preclusion, stating: "Under principles of claim 
preclusion, they had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
their first amendment claim in the state court, and here 
they merely seek a second bite at the apple." Id. (emphasis 
added). But, as with Guarino, that discussion came only 
after it was determined that the First Amendment claim in 
federal court was inextricably intertwined with the state 
court adjudication. See id. (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 
n.16). 
 
Our holding here that Rooker-Feldman does not bar 
jurisdiction in the District Court over Parkview's claims 
recognizes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is distinct 
from the affirmative defenses of preclusion.2 In Feldman, 
the Supreme Court sub silentio acknowledged the difference 
between the doctrines when, after directing remand of 
plaintiffs' general constitutional challenges, it expressly 
refrained from considering res judicata, leaving that 
question to the district court. See 460 U.S. at 487-88. 
Although occasionally the doctrines may overlap and even 
be blurred, they are not coextensive. As the Seventh Circuit 
has explained: 
 
       Equating the Rooker-Feldman doctrine with preclusion 
       is natural; both sets of principles define the respect 
       one court owes to an earlier judgment. But the two are 
       not coextensive. Preclusion in federal litigation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Issue preclusion, otherwise known as collateral estoppel, bars re- 
litigation of an issue identical to that in a prior action. Claim 
preclusion, 
otherwise known as res judicata, prohibits reexamination not only of 
matters actually decided in the prior case, but also those that the 
parties 
might have, but did not, assert in that action. See Bradley v. Pittsburgh 
Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1070 (3d Cir. 1990). We take no position 
on whether Parkview's claims might be barred under these doctrines. 
 
                                14 
  
       following a judgment in state court depends on the Full 
       Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1738, which 
       requires the federal court to give the judgment the 
       same effect as the rendering state would. When the 
       state judgment would not preclude litigation in state 
       court of an issue that turns out to be important to a 
       federal case, the federal court may proceed; otherwise 
       not. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, by contrast, has 
       nothing to do with S 1738. It rests on the principle that 
       district courts have only original jurisdiction; the full 
       appellate jurisdiction over judgments of state courts in 
       civil cases lies in the Supreme Court of the United 
       States, and parties have only a short time to invoke 
       that jurisdiction. 
 
GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 
(7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). 
 
This distinction between Rooker-Feldman and preclusion 
is important because Rooker-Feldman, as a jurisdictional 
doctrine, must override preclusion doctrines where it 
applies. Were we to hold that Rooker-Feldman was simply a 
jurisdictional version of claim preclusion, we would run 
afoul of the Supreme Court's directive that state law rather 
than federal law determines whether a claim brought in 
federal court is precluded by a prior state court 
adjudication. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 
U.S. 461, 481-82 (1982) (holding that a federal court 
presented with a Title VII case should apply state 
preclusion law when the plaintiff had previously obtained in 
state court on-the-record review of a state agency's decision 
on the plaintiff 's discrimination claim). 
 
Our decision is in line with the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the only other court of 
appeals to have faced this precise issue. In Centres, Inc. v. 
Town of Brookfield, Wis., 148 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 1998), 
the court held Rooker-Feldman did not bar a suit brought 
in federal court alleging that a local zoning board decision 
denying a permit violated due process rights, even though 
the plaintiff in federal court had appealed the zoning board 
decision to state court for on-the-record review. According 
to the court, the doctrine of claim preclusion, not Rooker- 
Feldman, provided the proper framework for considering 
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whether the plaintiff had waived its claims by appealing the 
agency's decision to the state court. 
 
IV. 
 
We thus hold that Rooker-Feldman does not bar the 
District Court's jurisdiction over the claims brought by 
Parkview in this case. In so holding, we do not intimate any 
view of the merits of Parkview's case or whether preclusion 
doctrine is applicable. The City raised a series of challenges 
to the complaint, but because the District Court held there 
was no jurisdiction, it did not reach any other issue. On 
remand, it will undoubtedly turn to other issues. We will 
reverse the order of the District Court dismissing for lack of 
jurisdiction and will remand for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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